We investigate whether the price run-up in a company's stock prior to the initiation of analyst coverage with a favorable recommendation is related to the occurrence of an analyst-hosted invitation-only investor conference attended by the company. We document an average abnormal return of 2.41% (0.91%) during the twenty days prior to analyst initiations when conferences are hosted by initiating (non-initiating) analysts and 0.54% in the absence of these conferences. The abnormal returns are concentrated on conference days at 0.58% (0.17%) when conferences are hosted by initiating (non-initiating) analysts. Further, the price run-up and conference day returns predict the level of initiating recommendations. We conclude that investor conferences are significant venues where select investors obtain initiation-related information from initiating analysts or participating companies that other investors obtain when the initiations are publicly announced. Our conclusions are consistent with anecdotal evidence that securities firms communicate their research increasingly with the most profitable clients.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sell-side equity analyst research has been shown to influence equity prices and trading volume at the time of its wide distribution, with wide distribution typically defined as third-party research distribution by First Call and I/B/E/S.
1 Analyst communications with investors, however, are hardly limited to third-party research distribution, raising the question of whether and how analysts preferentially distribute their research to select investors. This question is of enormous interest to users of analyst research, brokers, and regulators; the investment value of analyst research to an investor depends on how widely it is distributed when the investor receives it. While brokers' internal policies and Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)'s rules and regulations about fair dealings with customers may not allow the pre-release of research to select investors, cases of analysts and sales people pre-releasing research exist (Taylor 1995; Smith 2003; Bray 2008) .
2 Surprisingly, this question has not received its due attention in the academic literature.
A notable exception is Irvine et al. (2006) , who argue that analysts have incentives to pre-release their research to select investors (the tipping hypothesis). The authors claim to show evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Specifically, they show elevated institutional trading and price run-up prior to wide distribution of initiating Buy recommendations. Irvine et al. take an important first step toward explaining the process by which information is distributed to investors; the process is not instantaneous and wide distribution of analyst research is merely its end point. Can one therefore conclude that institutional trading and price run-up prior to analyst initiation is the result of analyst research being pre-released?
We have several reasons for answering this question in the negative, leading us to revisit the analyst tipping hypothesis. First, in competitive information and capital markets 1 See Ramnath et al. (2008) and Beyer et al. (2010) for a survey of the equity analyst literature. 2 FINRA is the self-regulatory organization of financial intermediaries that succeeded the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) in 2007 with a mission to promote investor protection and market integrity.
such as the United States markets, information discovered and used by the initiating analyst is likely to be simultaneously discovered by other investors. The existence of institutional trading and price run-up in the pre-initiation period is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to conclude that the initiating analyst leaks information to select clients.
Second, select investors may have obtained the same information from the company without any direct involvement of the initiating analyst. An initiating analyst typically visits with the company's management or has management verify company information that will be included in the initiation report (Reingold 2006, p. 61 and 67) . A manager who believes that initiation is likely or imminent may use varying channels to communicate both his belief and the facts on which this belief is based to select investors.
Finally, the tipping hypothesis is far from universally accepted. The recent analyst literature surveys in Ramnath et al. (2008) and Beyer et al. (2010) as well as Bradshaw's (2009) incisive commentary do not discuss the validity of this hypothesis. Altinkilic and Hansen (2009) reject it on the basis of evidence about the match between public information events and subsequent changes to analyst recommendations. 3 We seek to extend the extant evidence on the tipping hypothesis by proposing an important venue where tipping about upcoming coverage initiation with a favorable recommendation likely takes place. We argue that select investors interact with a company's management at analyst-hosted, invitation-only investor conferences shortly prior to the initiation. The company presentations at such conferences and private interactions around this event indicate an increased flow of nonpublic information from the hosting analyst or the company to select investors about an upcoming initiation.
Our hypothesis that initiation-related information is released at investor conferences makes several empirical predictions. First, the price run-up in the company stock would be higher when the initiation is preceded by the company participation at an analyst-hosted conference. Second, the price run-up would be concentrated on conference days relative to non-conference days. Third, the price run-up would correlate with the level of recommendation of the upcoming initiation. Finally, these effects would be more pronounced when the initiating analyst hosts the conference.
Empirically, we investigate the existence of analyst-hosted conferences during the twenty trading days prior to Buy initiations (which include both Strong Buy and Buy initiations on a five-tier rating system). The total number of Buy initiations that meet our data Consistent with our predictions, the price run-up during the twenty trading days prior to initiations (the tipping period henceforth) strongly depends on whether a conference takes place and whether the conference is hosted by the initiating analyst. Collectively, we find strong evidence that the price run-up prior to analyst initiations is larger when to-be-initiated companies present at analyst-hosted conferences, and that conference day returns are many times larger than non-conference day returns. We also find that more information is impounded in prices when conferences are hosted by initiating analysts than when they are hosted by non-initiating analysts. Our explanation for this difference is that initiating analysts in effect initiate coverage at the conference, i.e., they make it known to investors that they will almost surely initiate coverage shortly (within 11 trading days on average). In contrast, the initiation event remains uncertain when conferences are hosted by non-initiating analysts, despite some evidence of private communications from the company management about an upcoming initiation.
A competing explanation for our findings is that initiating analysts and select investors obtain private information from company management at conferences and that this private information simultaneously prompts analysts to initiate coverage and investors to trade. This explanation is less likely, because analysts have to make substantial investments in company research and broker-related compliance before announcing initiations of coverage, a process possibly taking longer than the average 11-day gap between the conference and the initiation. Yet, initiating analysts may pre-screen and invite only those potential companies that may get initiated based on information these companies disseminate during the conference. Such pre-screening may enable analysts to initiate shortly after the conferences. Similar to our explanation, this competing explanation also suggests that analysts organizing conferences in effect initiate coverage on the conference day, though in some cases with some uncertainty based on company-based information at the conferences.
Both explanations emphasize the role of analyst-hosted conferences in delivering initiationrelated information to select investors.
Our study contributes to the literature on analyst tipping by identifying a particular institutional arrangement, analyst-hosted conferences, that govern private information exchanges among companies, analysts, and select investors before initiations of analyst coverage. This is an important contribution because neither studies promoting the tipping hypothesis (Irvine et al. 2006; Christophe et al. 2009; Juergens and Lindsey 2009) , nor studies rejecting it (Altinkilic and Hansen, 2009 ) account for actual interactions that take place before initiations, raising doubts on prior evidence on tipping.
Most importantly, our study deepens our understanding of the information intermediary role of equity analysts. Prior academic literature focuses on widely distributed research, giving the impression that all clients equally benefit from analyst research. Our evidence that analyst-hosted invitation-only investor conferences explain the price run-up prior to initiations, in combination with anecdotal evidence that equity analysts actively communicate with select investors and provide select investors with access to management (Schack 2007; Groysberg 2010 ) refutes this impression and suggests that analyst activities benefit some clients more than others. Our study is well-timed: According to Schack (2007) , securities firms' response to recent regulatory reforms has been to deemphasize the distribution of research to all clients and emphasize the provision of special services to select clients.
We acknowledge that the informational role of conferences is likely broader than tipping. Investors attending analyst conferences may benefit from significant cost savings and information externalities due to their meetings with the management teams of companies in the same industry. Conferences may also help attendees better interpret various information and corporate events as well as hosting analyst research.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 reports our empirical analysis, and Section 4 concludes.
II. HYPOTHESES
We first discuss prior work on analyst tipping and present institutional facts that explain the limitations of the original analyst tipping hypothesis. We then present our hypotheses and empirical predictions.
Background
If an analyst distributes research to all clients at the same time, information is quickly impounded in prices, and, assuming no limits to arbitrage, expected profits of the clients are zero (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Holden and Subrahmanyam 1992; Foster and Viswanathan 1996) . In this setting, clients would not pay high commissions, and brokerage business would be unable to recover the cost of equity research. 4 Analysts therefore have incentives to distribute information to select clients; this is the essence of the analyst tipping hypothesis articulated and tested first by Irvine et al. (2006) .
5
Evidence of analyst tipping consists of elevated institutional trading prior to wide distribution of analyst Buy initiations (Irvine et al. 2006) , and increased short selling prior to wide distribution of analyst downgrades (Christophe et al. 2009 ). In addition, Juergens and Lindsey (2009) shortly before analyst activity can be explained alternatively by investors receiving and acting upon information without any role of the analysts.
Research Services Provided to Select Investors
Brokerage houses spend significant resources to identify and service exclusively their most profitable clients. 6 Examples of research services provided to select clients are phone calls and instant messages from analysts (and sales people), as well as invitations to analyst "webcasts" where analysts discuss their research and answer questions. Also, analysts organize meetings between investors and company management; these meetings may take place at company headquarters, analyst-hosted invitation-only conferences, or other locations. Finally, analysts sometimes provide select investors with written commentaries on uncovered companies.
Special services are not against brokerage houses' internal policies and regulations.
The rules concern the distribution of published research, not the distribution of unpublished research or commentaries, 7 and they only require that published research be distributed to all clients at the same time. The fact that select clients are not given early access to published research does not mean that they are not given any information useful for anticipating the content of a research report that has yet to be distributed. Unsurprisingly, the above special services provided to select investors are valued more than services provided to all investors such as the distribution of published research. In fact, the former attribute has consistently dominated the latter on the list of the most desirable 6 The discussion borrows from Schack (2007) , Groysberg (2010), and Barclays Capital Inc. v. TheFlyOnTheWall.com. 7 Bolland (2007) warns analysts that information provided in a research report must not be the same as information provided in an earlier commentary because "this would give rise to accusations of front-running or unfair treatment of clients" (p. 154). It is hard to imagine, however, that information provided in an initiation report would be orthogonal to information provided in an earlier commentary. Type A conferences bring select clients together with two highly informed parties, the initiating analyst and the company management; either party may disseminate initiationrelated information that initiating analyst subsequently disseminates to all investors. Type B conferences bring select investors together with the company management, the only one party likely to possess information regarding upcoming analyst initiations. Non-initiating
analysts cannot be presumed to have knowledge of the initiating analyst's decision and the content of the initiation report, but the company management potentially possesses this information, because it is not uncommon for analysts to visit the company's management prior to initiation, or even have the management fact check initiation reports with investment ratings redacted. 9 The initiation of coverage with a favorable recommendation generally increases firm value, and the management may therefore choose to share with select investors the increased likelihood of coverage initiation and information that overlaps with that provided earlier in private meeting(s) with the initiating analyst. This scenario, which highlights the role of the company as a source of information for select investors, is overlooked by the original analyst tipping hypothesis.
We use cumulative abnormal returns during the 20-day interval prior to analyst Buy initiations as a measurement of information conveyed to select clients. We predict large cumulative abnormal returns if the occurrence of conferences prior to analyst Buy initiations signifies a larger flow of information to select clients. In addition, if more information flows to select investors on conference days than on non-conference days, abnormal returns on conference days would be larger than those on non-conference-days. Finally, these effects would be strongest when these conferences are hosted by initiating analysts, since only initiating analysts know whether and with what content they will initiate coverage.
Our hypothesis does not assume that conferences are the only venue where select investors obtain information about upcoming initiations. As discussed in the previous section, analysts communicate with select investors via e-mail, phone, and face-to-face; they can arrange a meeting with management at company's headquarters or some other location.
Therefore, our hypothesis only assumes the occurrence of a conference represents an increase in the flow of nonpublic information to select investors.
III. DATA Broker-Hosted Conferences
We obtain conference presentations from January Bushee et al. (2010) discuss the types of organizations that host investor conferences. 11 We exclude brokers employing less than five analysts in order to ensure that our sample includes reputable research providers. There is also concern that data from small providers may be of poorer quality-submitted with a delay, subject to more error, etc. Only five percent of the conferences are organized by brokers employing fewer than five analysts, and including these conferences does not affect our results. broker size and conference activity, a special service that caters to the needs of select clients.
Analyst Initiations
An analyst initiation is the first-ever recommendation on a particular stock by an IBES analyst in the sample period from 2004 to 2008, which is determined by the availability of conference data. 13 We eliminate initiations that are within three days of an earnings announcement; that are on companies with a stock price less than $1 on initiation day; and that are issued by brokers employing fewer than five analysts. This returns a sample of 39,555 initiations with different recommendation levels on 5,317 companies issued by 190
brokers. Brokers with conference activity account for a disproportionately large share of these initiations-31,681 initiations on 5,116 companies.
We next investigate the frequency and recommendation levels of initiations that are preceded within twenty or hundred trading days by analyst conferences. Panel A of Table 2 presents Table 3 Panels A to C provide descriptive statistics on the subsamples of Buy initiations. Since a company may be initiated by more than one broker, the unit of analysis is company-year. The three subsamples include companies with similar characteristics in size, book-to-market ratio, ROA, beta, stock price volatility, age, and past returns. For example, the median market capitalization is $782 million, $1.185 billion and $876 million; the median book-to-market ratio is 0.29, 0.30, and 0.41; and the median six-month CAR is 5.35%, 5.37%, and 3.24% in panels A, B, and C respectively. That the three subsamples include companies with similar characteristics (we cannot reject the null of equal location parameters for any characteristics) suggests-but does not guarantee-that differences in company characteristics will not confound our analyses of 20-day CARs.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
We test the prediction of tipping using three distinct analyses. First, we explore the price run-up in a company stock prior to coverage initiation in relation to the company's participation an analyst-hosted conference. Next, we test whether conference day abnormal returns are larger than non-conference day abnormal returns prior to initiations. Finally, we examine whether conference day returns relate with the level of recommendations issued when analysts initiate coverage.
Price Run-up
We calculate daily abnormal returns as the raw returns net of the value-weighted market returns in the period [-20, +5] Table 4 reports average cumulative abnormal returns and a run-up index over the period [-20, +5] for the three initiations subsamples presented in , and 25%, respectively. The ranking across subsamples is consistent with our hypothesis predicting that the largest flow of information to select investors takes place during conferences hosted by initiating analysts, followed by conferences hosted by non-initiating analysts. The differences in CARs are economically large and statistically significant, suggesting that hosting conferences is an important factor determining stock return patterns prior to analyst initiations. Further, the significant CAR in Type B initiations complements the traditional analyst tipping hypothesis asserting the pre-release of research only by the initiating analyst. It supports a more general version of this hypothesis that analyst-hosted conferences facilitate the flow of information (by the companies themselves) to select investors prior to its wide distribution in an initiation report.
We next extend the analysis conducted in Table 4 by controlling for company characteristics examined in Table 3 , the level of the initiating recommendation, and industry indicators. In particular, we pool the three subsamples analyzed in Table 4 
In the second model, we replace Conference with two indicators, Initiating Broker and NonInitiating Broker in order to separate conferences hosted by initiating analysts from conferences hosted by non-initiating analysts.
We use the following control variables. Strong Buy is an indicator variable equal to one if the initiation recommendation is a Strong Buy and zero otherwise. Log (Size) is a firm's market value of equity as of the end of the fiscal year prior to initiation. Book-tomarket is the ratio of a firm's book value to market value of equity as of the end of the fiscal year prior to initiation. Beta is the slope coefficient in a regression of a firm's daily stock returns on CRSP value-weighted index returns for the year prior to initiation. Past CAR is cumulative abnormal return over a six-month period ending 20 trading days prior to initiation day. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns for the year prior to initiation.
Age is the number of months between a firm's initial public offering date and initiation date.
In assessing the significance of coefficient estimates we use standard errors clustered by initiation day, allowing for non-zero correlation in the error term for firms initiated on the same day.
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Panels A and B in Table 5 term return reversal rather than momentum characterizes our sample of analyst initiations. 16 Clustering by month or using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors does not change our inferences.
Panel B shows that the price run-up depends on whether conferences are hosted by initiating or non-initiating analysts. The coefficient on Initiating Broker is constant at 1.86, while the coefficient on Non-Initiating Broker varies between 0.55 and 0.57 across models.
The differences in the above coefficient estimates are consistent with Table 4 , economically large at 1.3% and statistically significant at 10% level. We conclude that the effect of analyst-hosted conferences on the price run-up is significant and robust after controlling for differences in company characteristics, the level of the recommendation, and industry dummies. The results are also similar if we include broker fixed effects in the model.
We interpret the relation between conferences and the price run-up in the 20-day period prior to initiation as evidence of tipping, but a more innocuous explanation is that the run-up in this period is due to companies making public disclosures or other analysts distributing their own research. In other words, the firm or other analysts publicly disseminate information, which leads to a price run-up and an initiation report. This is a reasonable explanation-many studies report that individual analyst recommendations are correlated (Welch 2000) and follow management forecasts (Altinkilic and Hansen 2009 ). To preclude this explanation, we include variables indicating the occurrence of any management forecasts by the to-be-initiated firm or any recommendations on the to-be-initiated firm by non-initiating analysts in the tipping period. We find that while management forecasts and recommendations by other analysts indeed play a role in explaining the price run-up, the economic and statistical significance of the conference variables are unaffected.
Conference Day Returns
If select investors obtain more information on conference days than on nonconference days, we should observe greater abnormal returns on conference days than on non-conference days. We test this prediction using Type A and B initiations. We report Table 6 .
When conferences are hosted by initiating analysts (Type A initiations), average return on conference days (non-conference days) is 0.58% (0.10%). Furthermore, returns on days adjacent to conference days are also large; the average three-day CAR surrounding a conference day is 1.08% or 45% of the 20-day CAR of 2.41% reported in Table 4 . 17 The average return on initiation days is 1.63%, larger than conference day returns, but this is unsurprising. 18 Uncertainty concerning upcoming initiations is unlikely to be fully resolved at a conference, and for various reasons investors in attendance may decide not to trade to the point where their information is fully impounded in price. The wide distribution of an initiating recommendation would therefore affect stock price. 
The Level of Initiating Recommendations
A prediction that extends the study's hypothesis regarding pre-release of information prior to Buy initiations is that the same practice takes place prior to Hold and Sell initiations. We draw two conclusions on the basis of this evidence: select investors obtain information that allows them to anticipate information distributed in a Buy or Sell initiation report, and pre-release such information allows them to separate companies with upcoming Buy initiations from companies with upcoming Sell initiations.
19 Tests involving Sell coefficients have low power because there exist only ten Sell initiations in our sample. The relative lack of significance can also be attributed to the observation that investors may obtain information but choose not to act on it, perhaps because the cost of trading on negative information is higher than the cost of For Type B initiations, we document positive and significant coefficient estimates for Buy and Hold when conference day returns and post-conference returns are dependent variable, suggesting that investors view the two sets of companies the same way up to the initiation day. We also document positive and insignificant coefficient estimates for Sell.
When initiations are announced, a Buy initiation's price run-up of 0.65% accelerates to 1.93% as of Day +3; a Hold's price run-up of 0.40% drops to -0.33%; and a Sell's price runup of +0.58% drops sharply to -1.97%. In comparison to Type A initiations, the evidence for Type B initiations reveals that uncertainty regarding the timing and the level of initiation largely remains until the initiation day, though we see modest predictions about an upcoming Buy initiation.
To summarize, we find evidence that select investors obtain preferential initiationrelated information (about the timing of initiation and level of recommendation) during conferences organized by initiating analysts. Investors are able to distinguish companies initiated with a Buy recommendation from companies initiated with less favorable recommendations. The same conclusion does not hold as strongly for conferences organized by non-initiating analysts.
V. CONCLUSION
The original tipping hypothesis proposed by Irvine et al. (2006) does not account for multi-party interactions among select investors, analysts, and companies. We identify analyst-hosted invitation-only investor conferences, which are held shortly prior to one fifth of all coverage initiations with favorable recommendations, as a particular institutional arrangement that governs the interactions among companies, analysts, and select investors.
We explore whether and how this arrangement facilitates the flow of information to select investors. Specifically, we test whether the price run-up in a company stock prior to initiation of coverage with a Buy recommendation is higher when the company presents at these conferences, and whether the run-up is concentrated on conference days.
We document an average cumulative abnormal return of 2.41% (0.91%) during the twenty days prior to initiations when conferences are hosted by initiating (non-initiating)
analysts and only 0.54% in the absence of these conferences. The daily abnormal returns in this period are concentrated on conference days at 0.58% and 0.17% for conferences hosted by initiating and non-initiating analysts, respectively. We conclude that analyst-hosted conferences are a significant venue where select investors obtain information that others obtain on initiation days. In contrast, the timing and content of initiation remain less certain when conferences are hosted by non-initiating analysts, despite likely private communications from the company management about a potential initiation of coverage.
A contemporary study by Bushee et al. (2010) shows that investor conferences hosted by brokers and other entities are associated with price and volume reactions, and conclude that these conferences convey new information to investors. Our study complements their work. We focus specifically on analyst-hosted conferences, and show that analyst initiationrelated information is disseminated to select clients at these events. We therefore make a key contribution to the understanding of analyst tipping, a phenomenon documented first by Irvine et al. (2006) and then questioned by Altikinkilic and Hansen (2010).
Our study also contributes to a broader literature exploring the sources of institutional investors' informational advantage (Acharya and Johnson 2007; Massa and Rehman 2008; Jegadeesh and Tang 2010) . In particular, our evidence suggests that special services provided by equity analysts to their best institutional clients are a source of informational advantage to institutional investors. These special services likely include analysts' tipping select investors about information other than the initiation decisions (such as continuing recommendations) using venues other than the conferences (such as private correspondence, webcasts, etc.)
We caution against making policy recommendations based on our evidence. First, both hosting conferences and attending conferences are costly activities, and market participants would not engage in them unless they expected to recover these costs (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980) . Our evidence suggests that benefits do accrue for those in attendance, but whether or not these benefits are abnormal is a separate topic. Second, we heed Demsetz's (1969) call for making policy recommendations based only based on a comparative analysis of real alternative institutional arrangements, and how these arrangements solve real economic problems. Analyst-hosted invitation-only investor conferences are a novel institutional arrangement largely ignored by academic literature that governs how and when analysts, managers, and select investors exchange information. We leave it for future
research to explore what real economic problems this arrangement solves. [-20, -1] and [-100, -1] with Day 0 defined as the initiation day. Panel A uses all initiations from 190 brokers, irrespective of whether or not they hold conferences. Panel B only uses initiations from 87 brokers known to host conferences, and presentations at conferences hosted by the analyst initiating coverage of that company. Definitions (defined at the end of the fiscal year prior to initiation): Log (Size) = Natural log of market value of equity; Book-to-market = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity; ROA = Return on assets defined as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; Beta = Slope coefficient of the regression of a firm's daily stock returns on CRSP valueweighted market returns; Volatility = Standard deviation of daily stock returns; Age = Number of months between initial public offering date and the initiation date; and Past CAR = Cumulative abnormal return over a six-month period ending 21 trading days before initiation day, where abnormal returns are company stock returns less CRSP valueweighted market return. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. = An indicator equal to one if an initiation is preceded by a conference presentation at an initiating analyst-hosted conference, and zero otherwise. Non-Initiating Broker = An indicator equal to one if an initiation is preceded by a conference presentation at a non-initiating analyst-hosted conference, and zero otherwise. Strong Buy = An indicator equal to one if an initiation is a strong buy recommendation, and zero if it is a buy recommendation. Log (Size) = Natural log of market value of equity; Book-to-market = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity; Beta = Slope coefficient of the regression of a firm's daily stock returns on CRSP value-weighted market returns; Volatility = Standard deviation of daily stock returns; and Age = Number of months between initial public offering date and the initiation date. , and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Variable Definitions: Initiating Broker = An indicator equal to one if an initiation is preceded by a conference presentation at an initiating analyst-hosted conference, and zero otherwise. Non-Initiating Broker = An indicator equal to one if an initiation is preceded by a conference presentation at a non-initiating analyst-hosted conference, and zero otherwise. AR [C] = Abnormal returns (the stock return net of the CRSP value-weighted market return) on conference days; CAR [C-1, C+1] = Cumulative abnormal returns between one day before the conference and one day after the conference; AR [0] = Abnormal returns on initiation days; AR [NC] = Abnormal returns on non-conference days; and CAR [-20, -1] = Cumulative abnormal returns between Day -20 and Day -1 (where Day 0 is the initiation day). , and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
The table presents the results from the regressions of conference day abnormal returns and postconference cumulative market adjusted returns on the levels of initiation recommendations that shortly follow the conferences. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using standard errors clustered by initiation day.
Variable Definitions: AR[C] = Abnormal returns on conference days; CAR[C-1,C+3] = Cumulative abnormal returns between one day before and one day after the conference; CAR [C,-1] = Cumulative abnormal returns between conference day and one day before the initiation; CAR [C, +3] = Cumulative abnormal returns between Day -20 and Day -1 (where Day 0 is the initiation day); Buy = An indicator equal to one equal to one if the recommendation of the coverage initiation is Strong Buy or Buy on a five-tier rating system; Hold = An indicator equal to one equal to one if the recommendation of the coverage initiation is Hold on a five-tier rating system; and Sell = An indicator equal to one equal to one if the recommendation of the coverage initiation is Sell or Strong Sell on a five-tier rating system. 
